Abstract: We consider a society in which each agent has one unit of a resource to allocate between two activities. Agents are organized in a social network, and each activity generates complementarities between neighbors. We find multiplicity of equilibrium for high intensity of interaction, and we characterize equilibria in terms of specialization and polarization. Overall, results reveal the crucial role played by network geometry. The results also suggest that the structure of the social network should be taken into account for the design of a public policy in favor of a specific activity.
Introduction
In many economic situations, individual behaviors are related to the choice of others in a reference group which may differ across agents. This view is documented by a huge empirical literature emphasizing the role of social networks in conveying peer effects.
1 Well-known examples concern social influence in the workplace (Mas and Moretti 2009) , education (Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zénou 2009), job search (Topa 2001) , criminality (Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman 1996) , or research activity (Goyal and Moraga 2001) . Essentially, this literature assumes that agents exert one activity in presence of peer effects. However, agents often undertake multiple activities within the same social network, and the role of social influence, in a multiple-activity setting, has not been addressed. This paper builds a model of competing activities in networks. Agents are organized in a fixed social network. They allocate a finite amount of resource between two activities, say activity 1 and activity 2, and each activity exhibits complementarities with neighbors. We examine the incentives to allocate the resource between the two activities.
2 Examples include the spread of a new idea, opinion, or practice in a social network (Valente 1995; Rogers 1995) , where both the old and the new practice exhibit local synergies. Importantly, practices are often not mutually exclusive, as illustrated in Coleman, Katz, and Menzel (1966) for diffusion of new drugs in the physicist communities, or in Rogers, Ascroft, and Röling (1970) for a study of the spread of farming practices in Brazil in rural villages. Conventions, like money or language, are also non-exclusive (Goyal and Janssen 1997) .
In this paper, our primary working example will be the behavior of adolescents sharing time between education and juvenile delinquency. 3 Indeed, many empirical studies stress the existence of social peers in both activities. Interestingly, two recent empirical studies identify social peer effects in both activities on the same social network (AddHealth data). Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zénou (2009) identify peer effects in education, and Liu et al. (2012) show that the criminal activity of students is affected by the crime behavior of their social contacts. Further, both papers show that a specific network centrality measure, the Bonacich centrality, 4 affects individual behaviors. Given the abstractness of the model, it may be also relevant regarding other applications. To cite a few, let us mention job contact versus informal sector opportunities, where the network represents social contacts between job seeker, synergies may result from information transmission; work versus leisure, as local complementarities may arise in both activities; or research versus teaching in the academic world, where the network represents the social contacts of colleagues. The competition aspect of the activities (on the resource) on the same network, and the boundedness of action space, raises new research questions. We try to understand the impact of the network structure on individual choices. In particular, does the network favor the same activity for all on the network, or can it be the case that part of the society invests more in one activity, while the other part invests more in the other activity? Expressed differently, can large disparities over the spectrum of possible resource allocation choices emerge in the society? To which extent should a public policy, aimed at sponsoring a specific activity, take into account the structural pattern of social relationships through which peer effects transit?
To study these issues, we consider a standard linear-quadratic utility setting, which generates linear interaction between individual choices. A specialized agent, in our context, puts her resource on a unique activity. We assume that agents are not specialized under autarky, i.e. they devote a positive resource to each activity. The society is polarized when, with regard to autarky, some agents devote more resource to one activity while others devote more resource to the other activity. To isolate pure network effects, we assume homogeneous agents, thus in our model polarization is related to differentiated incentives that can result from the structural features of the network of interaction. This explanation complements other factors, like heterogeneous individual characteristics, wealth inequalities, and ethnic considerations, that contribute to explain the emergence of a polarized society. Of course, interaction may also shape individual characteristics, as in the model of skill accumulation with peer influence of Mookherjee, Napel, and Ray (2010) .
Our analysis yields four main insights. The driving forces behind these results are, on the one hand, the attractiveness of each activity, which is homogeneous across agents (it does not depend on the position of the agent in the network), and, on the other hand, the local synergies between individual choices, which differ across individuals according to their respective positions on the network.
First, we show that, among the two activities, only one is promoted in the following sense: on any network and for all intensities of synergies, there exists a unique equilibrium such that the network favors that activity for all agents (with regard to autarkic choice). This equilibrium is locally stable. A parameter, which captures both preferences and synergies and that we name attractiveness multiplier, determines which activity is favored. Without loss of generality at this step and for clarity, we posit that this parameter is positive, and we name activity 1 the activity favored by the network. Importantly, the attractiveness multiplier does not depend on the network geometry. As in the one-activity case without resource constraint, the Bonacich centrality still shapes efforts, but it is now scaled by the magnitude of the attractiveness multiplier. Moreover, when the intensity of synergies is low enough, this is the unique equilibrium, and it is globally stable.
Second, when synergies are high, other stable equilibria can emerge. The threshold value above which multiplicity emerges is network-dependent. A maximal and a minimal equilibrium exist (in the sense of the ranking of efforts in activity 1). The equilibrium described above, which favors activity 1 for all agents and for any intensity of interaction, is the maximal equilibrium. We then provide a sharp characterization of stable equilibria. In particular, we show that any stable equilibrium distinct from the maximal equilibrium contains at least one agent specialized in activity 2. More, for high enough intensity of interaction, the configuration in which every agent is specialized in activity 2 is an equilibrium.
Third, some networks, but not all, can generate stable and polarized equilibria. To give a flavor, stable polarized equilibria may obtain on regular networks (that is, networks in which all agents have the same number of neighbors); however, this cannot happen on the star network. This means that, to understand whether the society can exhibit a high level of diversity or not, the network geometry crucially matters.
Last, our analysis suggests that a public policy should take into account the network structure in several respects. 5 In the context of education versus crime, a policy intervention may be designed in the purpose of enhancing education. When there is a unique equilibrium, a relevant policy intervention may consist in altering activity costs and preferences. Interestingly, modifying costs alters the intensity of interaction (increasing activity costs reduces the strength of interactions), which may have crucial implications on the design of an optimal public policy. Consider indeed the following alternative public policies: a first one consists in increasing the cost of crime -e.g. by increasing fines -a second one consists in decreasing the cost of education -e.g. by reducing transportation cost to school. We show that the sign of the attractiveness multiplier plays a crucial role. More precisely, when, on a given network, the attractiveness multiplier is negative, i.e. education is less attractive than criminal activity, the network effect and the policy goal are not aligned; therefore it may be preferable to increase the cost of crime rather than to decrease the cost of education, because the former (resp. the latter) induces a decrease (resp. an increase) in the intensity of interaction. Symmetrically, when the attractiveness multiplier is positive, i.e. education is more attractive than criminal activity, the network effect is aligned with the policy goal. In such a situation, the policy gains by increasing the intensity of interaction since the network effect reinforces the policy effect. In order to benefit from the network effect reinforcement, a policymaker may thus try to decrease the cost of education, and not engaging a policy trying to increase the cost of crime. Moreover, the analysis underlines the decisive role of the elasticity of Bonacich centrality with respect to the intensity of interaction. Under equilibrium multiplicity, the policy action may primordially be oriented toward the selection of a desirable equilibrium. In this regard, when the attractiveness multiplier is positive, meaning that education is more attractive than crime, a performing policy may target full-time criminals, and manipulate the network adequately, in order to reach the maximal equilibrium, which favors education for all.
From a theoretical perspective, this paper contributes to the theory of network games with linear interaction. Some recent papers examine linear interaction on networks Zénou 2006, Ballester and Bramoullé, Kranton and d'Amours 2014) . We consider a network game where agents undertake actions which are complements with their neighbors' actions, and action space is bounded. We relate the Nash and stable equilibria of this game to network geometry. This model is to our knowledge the first to propose a study of linear complementary interaction on networks under high intensity of interaction, 6 and our approach reconciles network games with complementarities and equilibrium multiplicity, a salient feature of the general theory of games with complementarities (Cooper and John 1988) . We undertake this analysis by unifying the linear game approach with tools imported from supermodular games and potential functions. In contrast with our paper, some recent works address equilibrium multiplicity under discrete actions. Along this vein, study a general model of complementarities (both positive and negative) and incomplete information. The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the formal model. Section 3 studies equilibria under both low and high intensity of interaction. Section 4 examines policy intervention, and Section 5 concludes. All proofs are gathered in Appendix A, and Appendix B presents some basic properties of the elasticities of Bonacich centralities with respect to the intensity of interaction.
The model
In this section, we introduce the basic ingredients of our model. This includes a description of the social network and of the notion of Bonacich centrality, the game and individual utilities, and stability concepts.
Basic notations
Real numbers or integers are written in lower case, matrices (including vectors) in capitals. For any two matrices X; Y, we say that X ! Y if and only if x ij ! y ij for all i; j; X > Y if and only if X ! Y with at least one ði; jÞ such that x ij > y ij ; X >> Y if and only if x ij > y ij for all i; j. Let 0 ¼ ð0; 0; . . . ; 0Þ denote the column-vector of zeros, 1 ¼ ð1; 1; . . . ; 1Þ denote the column-vector of ones. Define I n as the identity matrix of size n.
The social network, Bonacich centralities
Let N ¼ f1; 2; :::; ng be a set of agents, organized in a network representing social contacts with peers. The social network is assumed to be exogenous throughout the paper. Formally, we introduce the set G of all n Â n f0; 1g-matrices that are symmetric and with null diagonal elements. 7 
Utilities
Each agent is endowed with one unit of a resource to allocate between two activities. Depending on the context, the resource may be time, a monetary investment, or space. Let x i 2 ½0; 1 (resp. y i 2 ½0; 1) be the share of the resource that agent i devotes to activity 1, and y i 2 ½0; 1) be the share of the resource that agent i devotes to activity 2. Then, X ¼ ðx 1 ; x 2 ; Á Á Á ; x n Þ (resp. Y ¼ ðy 1 ; y 2 ; . . . ; y n Þ) the profile of shares devoted to activity 1 (resp. activity 2). We interpret x i as agent i's effort in activity 1. As Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zénou (2006) and for the sake of simplicity, we consider linear-quadratic utilities with local synergies. We assume that utility is activity-separable:
with a 1 ; c 1 ; a 2 ; c 2 > 0. We assume λ 1 ; λ 2 > 0, that is, efforts of neighbors are strategic complements along each activity. The quantity λ 1 x i x j (resp. λ 2 y i y j ) measures the synergy between two neighbors i and j with regard to activity 1 (resp. activity 2).
Binding resource
Given that both activities are costly, in principle the resource may not be fully exploited if activity costs are high enough. We assume that an isolated agent exploits the full resource, which is guaranteed by the condition
Since externalities are positive, this inequality also implies that socialized agents exploit their own resource fully, that is, x i þ y i ¼ 1. The equilibrium effort under autarky is easily shown to be x 0 ¼ a 1 Àa 2 þc 2 c1þc2 , that we assume in 0; 1½. That is, absent any interaction, an agent allocates a positive amount of resource to both activities, and this amount is homogeneous across individuals. We define for convenience v i ðXÞ ¼ u i ðX; 1 À XÞ. Given the binding individual resource constraints, we have y i ¼ 1 À x i for all i, and individual i's utility becomes
When some agent increases effort in activity 1, she mechanically decreases effort in activity 2. This makes externalities endogenous to agents' effort levels.
Basically,
That is, increasing agent j's effort in activity 1 induces a net positive externality to agent i only if the effort of agent i in activity 1 is larger than the threshold x e ¼ λ2 λ 1 þλ 2 . Second,
When some neighbor increases effort in activity 1, this reinforces incentives to invest in activity 1 (λ 1 ). But at the same time, due to resource constraint, the increase of the neighbor's effort in activity 1 mechanically decreases her effort in activity 2, which reduces incentives to invest in activity 2 (λ 2 ) and therefore increases incentives to invest in activity 1. We let γ ¼ λ 1 þλ 2 c 1 þc 2 be the ratio of synergies over costs of effort, we call it the intensity of interaction.
This stylized model captures the fact that, beyond the intrinsic returns of each activity, the social network conveys synergies. For instance, activity 1 may represent education, activity 2 may represent crime, and the individual resource may be time. Then, the higher the average time neighbors spend in education, the larger the incentives to spend time in education. The part of utility function related to education in our model is consistent with the empirical study of Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zénou (2009) , who identify local complementarities between efforts in education.
9 Symmetrically, the higher the average time neighbors spend to crime, the larger the incentives to exert criminal effort, and again, the part of the utility related to criminal activity in our model is conform to the empirical findings of Liu et al. (2012) . 10 Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that the absence of synergies between education and juvenile delinquency (utilities do not incorporate cross-terms x i Á y j ). Finally, it seems also reasonable to assume that adolescents spend the main part of their working time studying or exerting criminal activity; hence, the fact that the resource is binding seems natural in this context.
Specialization and polarization
Since individual resources are bounded from above, agents may devote full resource to one activity. We say that such agents are specialized:
Definition 1 (Specialization) In profile X, agent i is specialized if and only if x i 2 f0; 1g.
Alternatively, an interior agent i puts a positive amount of resource to both activities, i.e. x i 20; 1½. For any profile X, we define d n ðXÞÞ the corresponding profile. We define IðXÞ as the set of interior agents in profile X, X I the sub-profile of X restricted to interior agents, G IðXÞ the sub-network of G restricted to agents in IðXÞ.
In this model, some agents may exert more effort in activity 1 than under autarky, while others less. In this situation, resource allocations are said to be polarized:
Definition 2 (Polarization) Profile X is polarized if and only if there exists a pair of agents ði; jÞ such that x i > x 0 and x j < x 0 .
A society can be specialized and not polarized, polarized and not specialized, or both specialized and polarized. Note that, by assumption, both specialization and polarization emerge from interaction only.
Nash stability and asymptotic stability
A profile is a Nash equilibrium whenever each agent plays a best-response to others' choices.
11 In our convention, an interior equilibrium contains no specialized agent. Asymptotic stability is a useful refinement under equilibrium multiplicity (Weibull 1995) . Broadly speaking, a Nash equilibrium is asymptotically stable when, starting from the Nash equilibrium, any initial perturbation, provided sufficiently small enough, induces that a myopic best-response algorithm converges to the initial equilibrium.
12

The first-order conditions of the model
Given that synergies arise from neighbors only, behaviors depend on individual positions on the network. The first-order conditions keep track of the pattern of local interactions. Any solution X Ã to the first-order conditions satisfies
We define r i ðγÞ ¼ x 0 À γx e d i and RðγÞ ¼ ðr 1 ðγÞ; r 2 ðγÞ; . . . ; r n ðγÞÞ. We note that r i is decreasing in γ. The equation describing linear interaction is written ðI n À γGÞX ¼ RðγÞ. Technically, one particularity of the game is that the profile RðγÞ may contain negative components (if γ is high enough).
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Equilibrium characterization
In this section, we study the impact of the structure of the social network on individual decisions in terms of resource allocation. First, we focus on one particular equilibrium. This type of equilibrium exists for all intensities of interaction. We show that, under low intensity of interaction, this is the unique equilibrium, and it is globally stable. This equilibrium satisfies that the network 12 Following Weibull (1995, definition 6.5, 243) , consider the following differential system in continuous time: _ X ¼ f ðX; G; γÞ À X, where f ðX; G; γÞ is the best-reply function of the game. Then introduce fBðX; εÞ ¼ Y 2 R n þ : jjY À Xjj < εg and Äðt; YÞ the value at time t of the unique solution to the system of differential equations that starts at y (Äð0; YÞ ¼ Y). By definition, X is Lyapunov stable if "ε > 0; 9η > 0 : "Y 2 BðX; ηÞ; "t ! 0; Äðt; YÞ 2 BðX; εÞ. Then, X is asymptotically stable if it is Lyapunov stable and if 9ε > 0 : "Y 2 BðX; εÞ; lim t!1 εðt; YÞ ¼ X. 13 In terms of the primitive parameters of the model, it is always possible to modify parameter γ while keeping fixed x 0 and x e . favors the same activity for all agents; hence, this equilibrium is possibly specialized, but not polarized. Then, we will show that, under higher intensity of interaction, other stable equilibria may arise, and our study will underline the role played by polarization. Last, we will illustrate that the existence of stable polarized equilibria is geometry-dependent.
Uniqueness
We introduce some useful notation. We define
Then γ c depends on G. The condition γ < γ c obtains when either Bonacich centrality of the whole network is well defined or the vector RðγÞ >> 0. None of these two conditions implies the other one in general.
We also define the parameter m ¼ x 0 À x e , which we call attractiveness multiplier. In terms of primitive parameters, m ¼
λ1þλ2 . This quantity will play a crucial role in our analysis. This parameter, which is positively related to the attractiveness of activity 1 (relatively to activity 2), takes into account both private preferences and intensity of synergies between neighbors. Note that m is independent of the geometry of the network. It is positive if strategic complementarities in activity 1 are sufficiently high with regard to strategic complementarity in activity 2, or if the cost of effort in activity 2 is high enough in regard to activity 1, or if the relative unit private return of activity 1 vis-à-vis activity 2 is high enough. Until the end of Section 3, we will assume that m > 0. We define the region ðEÞ ¼ fX ! x 0 1g in which all efforts in activity 1 are higher than under autarky and region ðVÞ ¼ fX ! x e 1g. Thus, ðEÞ & ðVÞ as x 0 ! x e .
Theorem 1 For any γ > 0, there is a unique equilibrium, denoted X Ã , in region (V), and this equilibrium belongs to region ðEÞ. This equilibrium is locally stable and its basin of attraction encompasses region ðVÞ. For any γ < γ c , X Ã is the unique equilibrium, and it is globally stable.
Let us be more precise concerning the characterization of the equilibrium X Ã . In general, some agents may be specialized, others interior. The characterization of the efforts of interior agents takes this aspect into account as follows. Defining H ¼ 1 þ ð1 À x e ÞγD 1 ðX Ã ; GÞ, the equilibrium efforts of interior agents satisfy
Interior efforts are shaped by the Bonacich centralities as defined on the subnetwork of interior agents, and the set of interior agents can be of arbitrary size, according to the intensity of interaction.
Competing Activities in Social Networks
Individual efforts of interior agents are expressed as the sum of the autarkic effort, x 0 , plus a positive network effect. The influence of the network is the product of two factors: first, the attractiveness multiplier m, which can be either positive or negative, indicates which activity is promoted -here, we assumed m > 0 and thus, activity 1 is promoted. Second, positions of interior agents are taken into account through the Bonacich centrality measure (with decay parameter γ) associated with the network restricted to interior agents. More centrality enhances effort in activity 1 when the attractiveness multiplier is positive, otherwise more centrality enhances activity 2. Importantly, the magnitude of the attractiveness multiplier scales the impact of centrality on effort.
Basically, there exists a threshold value on γ, below which all efforts are interior (this threshold is clearly network-dependent), and above which some agents are stuck to 1. When the equilibrium is interior, efforts in activity 1 are written as:
It is worth emphasizing that, when the equilibrium is interior, Bonacich centralities are non-weighted, although the constant term of the linear system of first-order conditions, RðγÞ, is idiosyncratic (to get a non-weighted centrality, we exploit the fact that the idiosyncratic element is proportional to agent i's degree). There are at least three advantages to obtain a formulation of efforts as a function of a non-weighted Bonacich centrality. First, agents' efforts are more easily interpretable. Second, we do not need to impose any restriction on the positiveness of RðγÞ; this transformation will be useful particularly in case of high interaction (i.e. RðγÞ has at least a negative component). Last, non-weighted Bonacich centrality is monotonic in link addition (see Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zénou 2006) . In this regard, the empirical literature on crime economics stresses the relationship between network density and peer influence. For instance, Haynie (2001) indicates that "Network density, in particular, emerges as an important component of the delinquency-peer association, with very cohesive networks containing stronger delinquency-peer associations than those that are less cohesive." Consistently, our model predicts that if m < 0, adding any link would increase all efforts in criminal activity.
One theoretical interest of theorem 1 is the set of conditions under which the equilibrium is unique. Uniqueness requires a weaker condition than the condition γμ < 1, which is known from the literature on network games with linear interaction as a condition of concavity of the potential function (under symmetric interaction). Indeed, a second condition guarantees that the constant vector RðγÞ, in the first-order conditions given by system (3), is non-negative, otherwise some agents may find profitable exerting no effort under autarky, which would generate multiplicity, as we will show in the next subsection.
Theorem 1 has deep implication regarding the stability of equilibrium X Ã .
For low intensity of interaction, this equilibrium is globally stable, meaning that, wherever we start from in the action space, any sequence of myopic bestresponses ends up in X Ã . 14 Moreover, for high intensity of interaction, the basin of attraction of this equilibrium keeps large, and typically encompasses the region (V) where all efforts exceed x e . In particular, if all efforts are set up to x e initially, any agent, playing a myopic best-response, increases her effort to x 0 at first step. Then, due to the relative attractiveness of activity 1 (x 0 > x e ), efforts increase at further steps and will finally converge to X Ã .
Multiplicity
From theorem 1, we know that low intensity of interaction implies uniqueness. Moreover, for high intensity of interaction, even if an equilibrium exists outside region (V), uniqueness is preserved in region (V). The present subsection examines the case of high interaction and analyzes multiplicity issue. While global stability is guaranteed under low intensity of interaction, things are different under high intensity of interaction. Under multiplicity regime, not all Nash equilibria are stable and it is therefore important to identify stable Nash equilibria. Hopefully, bilateral symmetric interaction games have a potential function which is helpful in this regard. The following function Fð:Þ is a potential function associated with the game:
The shape of the potential function gives information about uniqueness and stability. Since the function is defined on a convex compact, global concavity, which occurs when ðI n À γGÞ is positive definite, guarantees a unique maximum and its stability. In particular, the matrix ðI n À γGÞ is positive definite if and only if γ < 1 μðGÞ . For higher intensities of interaction, the critical points of the potential function are critical points of the system of first-order conditions. Since the above potential has no minimum, all the critical points of the potential function are Nash equilibria. These critical points are either local maxima or saddle 14 This arises even if γ f < 1 μ . In that case, when γ 2γ f ; 1 μ ½ agents with maximal degree would stay at zero if their neighbors exerted no effort, but the condition γ < 1 μ guarantees that some of their neighbors exert positive effort.
Competing Activities in Social Networks
points. Maxima correspond to (local) concavity of the potential. In particular, the equilibrium X Ã is a global maximum. The maxima of the potential are thus asymptotically stable. The local stability of any equilibrium is guaranteed by a condition related to the intensity of interaction between interior agents (see details in Appendix A). In opposite, saddle points of the potential are unstable. This game being supermodular, it contains a maximal and a minimal equilibrium (Milgrom and Roberts 1990) . Since X Ã is the unique equilibrium in region (V), it is the maximal equilibrium. We denote γ 0 ¼ x0 xe
As m > 0, we get γ 1 < γ 0 . We note that, when γ ! γ 1 , X Ã ¼ 1, i.e. all agents are specialized in activity 1. Furthermore, when γ ! γ 0 , the configuration 0, in which all agents are specialized in activity 2, is stable and this is the minimal equilibrium. In terms of primitives, the condition γ > γ 0 , which implies RðγÞ << 0, is equivalent to λ 2 > a1Àa2þc2 d
. Hence, a deep conclusion is that, for sufficiently high intensity of synergies in activity 2, multiplicity obtains on any network. In the context of education versus crime, this means that both a high level of education and a high level of criminality can be sustained under high intensities of interaction. Indeed, when the intensity of interaction is high, the local synergies between criminals dominate the attractiveness of education, in such a way that, when all neighbors are full-time criminals, every agent is trapped into full-time criminality. This result is consistent with empirical findings underlying that peer effects affect criminal activity. For instance Thornberry et al. (2003) show that networks of criminals or gangs amplify delinquent behaviors. Recently, Drago and Galbiati (2012) document that peer effects affect recidivism.
To illustrate multiplicity further, we examine all homogeneous equilibria on regular networks (as we will see thereafter, regular networks may have equilibria with heterogeneous efforts levels). A k-regular network G k is such that every agent has k neighbors, k 2 f0; 1; . . . ; n À 1g. The effort at interior equilibrium is written xðkÞ ¼
1Àγk . This expression is well defined for any kÞ 1 γ and is increasing in k.
Hence, xðkÞ is a Bonacich centrality only for γ < γ 0 . When γ ! γ c , three equilibria with homogeneous effort appear (see Figure 1 ): configurations 0, 1, and an interior equilibrium; this latter lies out of region (E) and is unstable.
It is instructive to see how the intensity of interaction affects the potential function. To give a flavor, Figures 2 and 3 give a visual intuition of the shape of the potential function on the circle network. In principle the map has n coordinates; for convenience we plotted the three-dimensional map representing the potential as a function of x 1 and x 2 only, fixing coordinates x 3 ; x 4 ; . . . ; x n to zero. For Figure 2 we set a 1 ¼ 1; a 2 ¼ 0:95; λ 1 ¼ 0:01; λ 2 ¼ 0:01; c 1 ¼ 0:05; and c 2 ¼ 0:1, which corresponds to a case of low intensity of interaction.
For Figure 3 , we set a 1 ¼ 1; a 2 ¼ 1; λ 1 ¼ 0:1; λ 2 ¼ 0:35; c 1 ¼ 0:1; c 2 ¼ 0:1, which corresponds to a case of high intensity of interaction. These figures confirm that for low intensity of interaction, the potential function is concave and has thus a unique (global) maximum, which coincides with the equilibrium X Ã . In opposite, for high intensity of interaction, the potential function loses concavity of some dimensions, there exist corner maxima, and there can exist an unstable interior equilibrium (a saddle point of the map).
We turn now to general network structures. When γ ! γ c , an interior equilibrium (necessarily distinct from X Ã ) can appear. To see why, we note that the linear interaction system ðI n À γGÞX ¼ RðγÞ can also be written as ðI n À γGÞT ¼ 1,
component. This is compatible with an interior solution, and in particular containing components lower than x e (as illustrated in the case of regular networks -see Figure 1 ). That is, in contrast with Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zénou (2006) , the one-activity case without upper bounds on efforts, Bonacich centralities need not be well defined for the system to have interior solutions. However, this interior equilibrium is unstable. The next theorem characterizes stable equilibria:
Theorem 2 Suppose γ ! γ c and m > 0. Every stable equilibrium, distinct from X Ã , contains at least one agent specialized in activity 2 (i.e. a 0's). Moreover, when γ ! γ 0 , a stable equilibrium distinct from the configuration 0 contains at least one agent specialized in activity 1 (i.e. a 1's). Theorem 2 has a major implication regarding diversity. When the intensity of interaction is high enough, stable equilibria, except the maximal and the minimal equilibria, are polarized; that is, the society exhibits a high level of diversity. Furthermore, we remark that, When γ ! 1, in every stable equilibrium, there are no two distinct interior agents who are neighbors. Indeed, in this regime, feedbacks are explosive.
Regarding the issue of basins of attraction, two general messages emerge under high interaction. First, the size of the basin of attraction of the maximal equilibrium is large, encompassing region (V). Second, the size of basins of attractions of other stable equilibria can be very small (we illustrate this latter claim in the example depicted in Figure 7 thereafter). It is out of the scope of the present paper to fully characterize basins of attraction of stable equilibria. However, some related comments follow. First, all profiles lower (resp. higher) than the minimal (resp. maximal) equilibrium belong to its basin of attraction. Second, consider any stable equilibrium Z such that there is no unstable equilibrium with same interior agents. A simple sufficient condition for a configuration of efforts to lie in its basin of attraction is as follows. Consider a profile Y R, which defines an half-space). The above analysis shows that network structure decisively shapes incentives. In particular, for high intensity of interaction, multiplicity occurs, and polarized societies may emerge. When γ ! γ 0 , at the exception of the minimal equilibrium, all these stable equilibria are polarized. We examine how the geometry of the network affects the existence of polarization. First, some networks are incompatible with polarization. The star network (Figure 4-left) , core-periphery networks (Figure 4-center) , and complete bipartite graphs (Figure 4 -right) are all incompatible with a stable polarized society, whether or not the equilibrium contains interior agents. To build core-periphery networks, 15 divide agents into two groups, say groups 1 and 2. All agents in group 1 are connected with all agents in the society, and no pair of agents in group 2 are linked. In all these cases, the existence of only two classes of agents is key to contradict polarization.
Second, some networks cannot support a polarized equilibrium that would exclusively contain specialists. Obtaining a polarized society in which every agent is a specialist requires to partition the society into two groups such that every agent is strictly more linked with own group than with the other group. This problem is reminiscent, although distinct, from graph clustering or minimal cut set analyses. In graph clustering, the goal is to fragment the network into denser sub-networks. In minimal cut set analyses, the goal is to fragment the network by cutting a minimal number of links, and precisely, any partition of the society into two groups that results from minimal cut set satisfies that every agent is linked to at least the same number of agents in own group than in the other group. Back to our model, suppose that there exists a partition of the society into two groups such that every agent is strictly more linked with own group than with the other group. Under such a partition, there always exists a set of parameters making such a configuration stable, and this happens for arbitrary high values of γ. To illustrate, consider the 3-regular network depicted in Figure 5 . In the depicted example, the configuration in which agents in one group exert effort 1 while agents in the other group exert effort 0 can be sustained as a stable equilibrium (groups are encircled with a dash line). Note that, in this configuration, every agent is strictly more linked with own group than with the other group. 16 This property does not hold on any network. A simple case is given by the circle (Figure 6 -left) and related circle-based locally complete structures, that we name k-circles, k ! 1. To build such a class, we consider an even number of agents organized in a circle. Then, we add links in such a way that every agent is connected to her k closest neighbors in both directions of the circle (Figure 6 -right depicts a 2-circle). In these networks, no polarized stable equilibrium contains exclusively specialized agents (any configuration with 0's and 1's generates an immediate contradiction on incentives).
However, and perhaps less intuitive, polarized stable equilibria containing interior agents can emerge on regular networks. Figure 7 is spectacular in this regard. It presents such an equilibrium on a circle with 10 agents. Each group of interior agents is connected by a 3-player line. Everything equal, parameter γ should not be too high, otherwise the equilibrium is unstable. It should also not be too low, otherwise interior agents are attracted to region (E). Hence, stability requires a fine tuning in order to balance intra-group interaction and interaction with corner agents. Regarding the issue of basins 16 Every 3-regular network is compatible with polarization. Indeed, picking up any cycle, divide the society into two groups: that of agents in the cycle and that containing all other agents. Clearly, every agent is linked with at least two agents in her own group and with at most one agent in the other group.
of attraction, we observe that the size of the basin of attractions of this stable equilibrium is very small along some directions of fluctuations. For instance, if we consider a myopic simultaneous best-response algorithm with, as initial condition, the profile which differs from the equilibrium by the sole increase of components of initial value x by 0.01 (the other values being unchanged), then we escape the basin of attraction. The reason is simply that this small increase in the effort of those agents is sufficient to induce that the agents exerting initially no effort in activity 1 exert a positive effort level after a single revision. Since the new profile does not contain any agent exerting full effort in activity 2, all agents strictly increase their effort step by step and the dynamical process converges to X Ã .
Policy implications
We suppose that a public policy aims to promote a certain activity. In the context of education versus crime, a social planner may want to increase incentives to spend time in education. When X Ã is the unique equilibrium, the social planner may affect incentives by taxes or subsidies. Under equilibrium multiplicity, the major issue is how to escape from a bad equilibrium. Regarding each specific issue, theorems 1 and 2 have several public policy implications. 
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The induced variation of effort is the sum of an idiosyncratic effect and a network effect. The former corresponds to the variation of effort in autarky. The latter is shaped by two components: the variation of the attractiveness multiplier and the variation of the centrality. Importantly, the sign of parameter m affects directly the sign of the interaction component.
A policy intervention may consist in modifying preference parameters. For instance, in the context of education versus crime, a social planner may enhance individual preferences for education a 1 by increasing the expected revenue associated with education, by favoring the insertion of educated job seekers, or wages, and so on. Varying parameters a 1 or a 2 entails a positive idiosyncratic effect and a positive network effect (attractiveness effect is positive, and there is no interaction effect), thus the network contributes to the increase of individual efforts in education induced by parameter variation. This conclusion holds whatever the sign of parameter m. More, since centralities matter in the attractiveness component, the contribution of the network effect is differentiated across individuals: the higher the centrality, the larger the contribution.
An alternative policy action may consist in modifying cost parameters c 1 or c 2 . For instance, a state can lower the cost of education by building libraries or playgrounds, reducing transportation cost to schools, and so on. Alternatively, a state can increase the cost of criminal activity, for example, by exerting a higher effort in the protection of people or by increasing the level of penalties. Importantly, altering costs modifies the intensity of interaction. This implies that the interaction component is non-null, and according to the sign of the attractiveness multiplier, the interaction component can be negative, making ambiguous the consequence of cost variation on effort in education.
We start with the case where m < 0. Consider an increase of the cost of criminal activity, c 2 . The network effect is positive (both attractiveness and interaction effects are positive). This means that efforts in education increase and that the increase is larger than the increase which would obtain under autarky. In opposite, consider a decrease of the cost of education, c 1 . The interaction effect is negative, and thus the sign of the network effect is ambiguous. Indeed, on the one hand, lowering the cost of education makes education more attractive; on the other hand, the intensity of interaction γ is enhanced, which increases Bonacich centralities and fosters efforts in criminal activity. Therefore, for certain agents on the network, a decrease of the cost of education can induce a negative network effect. It is therefore important to identify such agents on the network. Let i ðG I ; γÞ ¼ The following example on regular networks illustrates the possibility of obtaining a negative network reaction for high elasticities. Assume for instance m < 0. For convenience, we let LðG; γÞ ¼ fi 2 Nn i ðG; γÞ > Àx0 m g denote the set of agents such that, following a decrease of cost of education, the network effect is negative. Let G k denote a regular network of degree k 2 f0; 1; . . . ; n À 1g, i.e. a network in which every agent has k neighbors. We find b i ðG k ; γÞ ¼ ; note that m < 0 implies that k c < 1 γ . Then, LðG k ; γÞ ¼ ; if k k c , while LðG k ; γÞ ¼ N if k > k c . Hence, when decreasing the cost of education, the network plays against the policy aim if the network is sufficiently dense.
This analysis suggests that the elasticity of Bonacich centralities with respect to decay is crucial to assess how the network reacts to a policy affecting activity costs. However, elasticities are complex objects, and are non-monotonic with respect to Bonacich centralities (see Appendix for a description of basic properties of elasticities). This means that the observation of efforts is not sufficient to detect agents with negative network effects. Moreover, if the policymaker has no information on the network structure, it would be desirable to pursue a policy that ensures that the interaction effect is positive. That is, increasing the cost of crime when m < 0; decreasing the cost of education when m > 0.
So far, we have shown that the network effect is ambiguous. The next proposition guarantees that, whatever the sign of the attractiveness multiplier, the sum of network effect and autarky effect is positive 17 :
Proposition 2 A marginal decrease of the cost of education, or a marginal increase of the cost of criminal activity, reduces all interior efforts in criminal activity.
Escaping from a bad equilibrium
The preceding analysis shows that equilibrium multiplicity emerges under high intensity of interaction. Multiplicity deserves some specific policy issues. One possible action may consist in modifying parameters in such a way to restore uniqueness; for instance, increasing the cost of crime should lower the intensity of interaction; this may eventually lead to restore uniqueness of the equilibrium X Ã , if the intensity of interaction after the shock is smaller than the threshold γ c .
17 The stability of X Ã is crucial. In unstable equilibria, the local interaction pattern may dominate, and a marginal decrease of the cost of education can increase some efforts in criminal activity. A simple example is the response of the interior equilibrium on regular networks under high interaction.
Competing Activities in Social Networks
Manipulating the network may also be relevant as a policy tool. In this regard, theorem 2 can be useful. Suppose that m > 0, i.e. education is more attractive than crime. In this case, the equilibrium X Ã is the maximal equilibrium and favors education for all. Then, equilibrium multiplicity raises the specific policy consideration of escaping from another equilibrium to reach the maximal equilibrium. The matter is to prevent agents from being trapped into an equilibrium where certain agents, if not all, exert a high level of effort in criminal activity. This issue is a well-known consequence of the presence of synergies or conformist attitude in coordination problems. Agents have a tendency to conform to the actions of others (Wilson 1987; Bernheim 1994) , which may stick individuals and aggregate behaviors to undesirable outcomes (Cooper and John 1988; Akerlof 1997; Brock and Durlauf 2001) . Our analysis departs from traditional policy concern in presence of strategic interaction, by its focus on network manipulation. Indeed, the main message of theorem 2 is that policy intervention can affect the network itself. Actually, without full-time criminals, the intensity of the interaction between interior agents is high enough to make this bad equilibrium instable. Thus, to foster education, some specific network-based policy tools, oriented toward the deterrence of full-time criminals, may be adopted. One possible intervention can be a key-player policy 18 targeted toward full-time criminals. The policy may consist in taking those individuals out of the network. 19 Another policy intervention is a key-link policy consisting in separating full-time criminals from each other, or facilitating interaction with agents exerting effort in education. That is, link manipulation may help reducing the interaction among full-time criminals or increasing interaction with the rest of the society, in the purpose of allowing them to escape from criminal activity. This policy has been considered in Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou (2010) , who analyze the computational efficiency of greedy algorithms that remove key links sequentially. Let us observe that dropping full-time criminals out of the network guarantees that the society will reach the maximal equilibrium, provided that the initial equilibrium is stable.
20
18 See Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zénou (2006) for the introduction of the concept in economics and see Liu et al. (2012) for a recent empirical study on the key-player in the context of criminal activities exerted by adolescents (the authors identify peer influence on the network of social contacts at school).
19 Interestingly, Ludwig, Duncan, and Hirschfield (2001) estimate that reallocating families from high-to low-poverty neighborhoods reduces juvenile arrests for violent offences by 30-50% of the arrest rate for control groups. 20 Following the drop out of full-time criminals, the obtained network G 0 satisfies the condition
This article has examined the impact of the structure of a social network on individual allocation of a resource between two non-exclusive activities. One key feature of the model is that the same social network conveys synergies in both activities. Our analysis has shown that, under low intensity of interaction, a unique equilibrium obtains, in which the network favors the same activity for all, and the sign of the attractiveness multiplier is key to understand which activity is favored compared to autarkic choices. In contrast, high intensity of interaction generates a multiplicity of stable equilibria. The study stressed the decisive role of the network structure in many respects. First, network geometry shapes individual choices between activities through Bonacich centralities. Second, polarization, and thus a high level of diversity, is geometry-dependent. Last, a public policy aiming at fostering one activity should take care of the structure of the social network, either by modifying adequately the network itself or by altering activity costs. It would be interesting to test the predictions of the model. For instance, in the context of education, Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zénou (2009) identify a positive impact of Bonacich centrality on performance at school. Our work suggests that if we replace performance with duration of activity, then, taking into account that the residual time may also generate utility (by exerting criminal or leisure activity for instance), the social network may not always enhance education (which is documented in Liu et al. 2012) .
Further, a natural theoretical extension could be to introduce heterogeneity in individual preferences. Moreover, the sociological literature argues that homophilic behaviors deeply shape social networks (see Rauch (2010) for a recent statement of this argument). Implicit is the idea that individuals group with people of similar characteristics, and this self-organized sorting is a natural road to polarization. It would be challenging to study the endogenous formation of the social network in such a context. Last, our primary example in this paper was education versus juvenile delinquency. Given the abstractness of the model, it may be also relevant to explore deeper some specific applications. To cite a few, let us mention the introduction of agricultural innovations in villages, where the network can represent the collection of adjacent rural areas, and synergies may result from shared facilities; job contact versus informal sector opportunities, where the network represents social contacts between job seeker, synergies may result from information transmission; work versus leisure, as local complementarities may arise in both activities; or research versus teaching in the academic world, where the network representing the social contacts of colleagues.
Appendix A: proofs
Bilateral symmetric interaction games 21 have a potential function (Monderer and Shapley 1996) . A potential function associated with the game satisfies that, for all i, for all x i ; x 0 i 2 ½0; 1 and all x Ài 2 ½0; 1 nÀ1 , Fðx i ; x Ài Þ À Fðx Monderer and Shapley 1996) . The following function Fð:Þ is a potential function associated with the game:
The shape of the potential function gives information about uniqueness and stability. In particular, critical points of the potential function are critical points of the system of first-order conditions (FOCs). Concerning stability, the above potential having no minimum, 22 all critical points are Nash equilibria. It contains either maxima or saddle points. Maxima correspond to strict (local) concavity of the potential. The maxima of the potential are thus asymptotically stable. In opposite, saddle points of the potential are unstable. Since the function is defined on a convex compact, global concavity, which occurs when ðI n À γGÞ is positive definite, guarantees a unique maximum and its stability. In particular, the matrix ðI n À γGÞ is positive definite if and only if γ < 1 μðGÞ .
23 More generally, the local stability of any equilibrium obtains under a similar condition related to the intensity of interaction between interior agents:
Condition 3 (Local stability) Consider a network G. An equilibrium X, including possibly specialized agents, is (locally) asymptotically stable when γμðG IðXÞ Þ < 1.
Three useful properties of games with complementarities follow. We say that the SBRA fX t g t > 0 crosses a configuration Y when there is some t 0 and some t 0 > t 0 such that X t0 < Y and X t 0 > Y. The following two simple properties, related to supermodular games, hold:
Property 1 Consider a Nash equilibrium X and a configuration X 0 , with either X 0 X or X 0 ! X. Then, a SBRA, starting at X 0 , does not cross X.
21 This terminology is due to Ui (2000) . 22 Matrix ðI n À γGÞ cannot be negative definite since matrix G has both negative and positive eigenvalues. 23 Consider λ; X some eigenvalue and associated eigenvector of matrix G. Then GX ¼ λX.
Basically, this means that ðI n À γGÞX ¼ ð1 À γλÞX. Thus X is eigenvector associated with eigenvalue ð1 À γλÞ of matrix I n À γG. Therefore all eigenvalues are positive if and only if γ < 1 μðGÞ (see for instance Bramoullé et al. (2013) , section VII, 28, for a rapid presentation of the case).
Next property is related to the direction of move of a SBRA:
Properties 1 and 2 are used to prove the next property, related to existence of equilibria:
Property 3 If there are two distinct equilibria X; Y with neither X ! Y nor Y ! X, there exists one third equilibrium Z with Z ! maxðX; YÞ.
Proof of property 3. Let profile Z 0 ¼ maxðX; YÞ. By property 1, since X and Y are equilibria, a SBRA starting at X 0 ¼ Z 0 cannot decrease at first step. Using property 2, the SBRA increases at any step. Then, the process converges to a new equilibrium that covers both X; Y and their cover Z 0 . ■ Properties 1 and 2 are also used to prove the following lemma, which is key to the analysis:
Lemma 1 Consider the linear system ðI n À γGÞX ¼ K, where k i > 0 for all i. There is a solution X ! 0 to the system (equivalently, the invert matrix ðI n À γGÞ À1 exists and is non-negative) if and only if γμðGÞ < 1. Moreover, if X ! 0, X ! K.
Proof of lemma 1.
If. If γμðGÞ < 1, the matrix ðI n À γGÞ À1 is non-negative and can be written ðI n À γGÞ À1 ¼ P 1 k¼0 ðγGÞ k . It follows that X ¼ P 1 k¼0 ðγGÞ k K, and thus X ! K.
Only if. If γμðGÞ ! 1, the series
Then X 1 ¼ K > 0, meaning that the process increases for all at first step. Continuing the process, property 2 ensures that X t increases at each step, and since the series diverges, the process goes to infinity. Now, assume that there is a solution X ! 0 to the system. The series X t crosses X, this contradicts property 1. □ A direct and useful implication of lemma 1 reads as follows. Let G be non-negative and γμðGÞ < 1. If ðI n À γGÞZ ! 0, then Z ! 0.
Proof of theorem 1.
(i) We prove that, for any γ > 0, region ðEÞ contains a unique equilibrium, X Ã .
Competing Activities in Social Networks
Step 1: a SBRA starting at X 0 ¼ x e 1 goes upward.
and by property 2 we are done.
Step 2: there is an equilibrium. This is a basic result from supermodular games (see Milgrom and Roberts (1990) for instance). Indeed, property 2, combined with the fact that efforts are bounded above guarantees the existence of an equilibrium.
Step 3: the equilibrium in region (E) is unique. Second, consider two distinct equilibria X; Y. By property 3, we can assume X > Y without loss of generality. Since Y lies in region (E), we have Y >> 0, and thus IðXÞ ( IðYÞ.
Step 3.1: we have ðI jIðYÞj À γG IðYÞ ÞðX À YÞ IðYÞ 0. 
Then we compute ðI jIðYÞj À γG IðYÞ ÞðX À YÞ IðYÞ . Two cases can arise Case 1: agent i 2 IðXÞ. We have
Moreover, as i 2 IðXÞ, we also have
Combining eqs [10] and [11], we obtain that
In total, from eqs [9] and [12], we find that for every agent i in IðXÞ,
Case 2: agent i 2 IðYÞnIðXÞ. We have
Thus, combining eqs [9] and [14], we get
Furthermore, the first-order condition imposes
From eq.
[15] and inequality [16], we get that, for every agent i in IðYÞnIðXÞ,
and we are done.
Step 3.2: we have γμðG IðYÞ Þ < 1. Let Z ¼ ðY À x e 1Þ jIðYÞj . Note that Z > 0 as Y lies in region (V). The linear system that Y solves can be written as: Step 3.3: it holds that X Y (a contradiction). Given that γμðG IðYÞ Þ < 1, we have X Y by direct application of lemma 1.
(i) We prove that the equilibrium X Ã is locally stable and its basin of attraction encompasses region ðVÞ. From stage 3.2 in the preceding proof, we know that γμðG IðYÞ Þ < 1. Thus the condition 3 holds, which guarantees local stability. The size of the basin of attraction contains region (V) by standard arguments of supermodular games. Indeed, consider a SBRA fX t g starting from X 0 in region (V). It is easily shown that for all t ! 1, X t ! x 0 1.
Since the equilibrium is unique in region (E), the SBRA converges to X Ã .
(ii) We show that the efforts of interior agents in activity 1 are characterized by the Bonacich centrality of the network restricted to interior agents G I . (iii) We show that, for any γ < γ c , there is a unique equilibrium, and that it is globally stable. We will first consider the case γμðGÞ < 1, and, second, the case γ < γ f .
Case 1: we suppose that γμðGÞ < 1. The point follows from the following two lemmas:
Lemma 2 Let G be non-negative and γμðGÞ < 1. Proof of lemma 3. Given that γμðGÞ < 1, we have that ðI À γGÞ À1 ! 0. Let ZðYÞ be the set of agents such that their efforts are less than 1 (they could be zero Given that x 0 < 1, we have x 0 G ZðYÞ 1 ZðYÞ þ D We conclude that y Ã i ! x 0 > 0 for all i. ■ From lemma 3, we have that any equilibrium belongs to region (E). Now, by statement (i), this equilibrium is unique.
Case 2: we suppose that γ < γ f . Consider two equilibria X; Y. Following stage 3 of the proof of proposition 1, it is without loss of generality to assume that X > Y with IðXÞ & IðYÞ with strict inclusion. Then, we find that ðI jIðYÞj À γG IðYÞ ÞðX À YÞ IðYÞ 0 (we omit the proof, which is identical to stage 3.1 of the proof of proposition 1). Now, remind first that RðγÞ >> 0, i.e. the first equation in system [3] admits a positive right-hand side, and second that γμðG IðYÞ Þ < 1. We can therefore apply lemma 1 (replacing Z with Y and G with G IðYÞ ), which implies that ðX À YÞ IðYÞ 0, a contradiction.
The global stability for γ < γ c follows directly from uniqueness. Indeed, in supermodular games, a large class of adaptive processes (including SBRA) converge to a value in-between the minimal and the maximal equilibrium (see Milgrom and Roberts 1990, 1270 The right-hand side of eq.
[21] is thus negative. Using lemma 1 again, an increase of the cost of activity 1 leads to an decrease of all efforts in activity 1. ■ Appendix B: basic properties of the elasticities of Bonacich centralities with respect to the intensity of interaction
The previous analysis suggests that the elasticity of Bonacich centralities with respect to decay is crucial to assess how the network reacts to a policy affecting activity costs. In this appendix, we examine some of their basic properties.
We have ε i ðG; γÞ ¼ 
½22
The elasticity is finite if Bonacich centrality is finite
Notice that the Bonacich centrality is defined when γμðGÞ < 1. Consider some real number β > 1 and such that βγμðGÞ < 1. We remark first that there exists some integer q 0 such that q β q for any q ! q 0 . Indeed, this means 1 lnðβÞ lnðqÞ < q for any q ! q 0 , and this basically holds for some q 0 . Then, for this integer q 0 , we have P q!q 0 qγ q d i;q ðGÞ P q!q 0 ðβγÞ q d i;q ðGÞ. Hence, since the letter series is a Bonacich centrality, it is finite, meaning that the numerator of the elasticity is also finite. This proves that the elasticity is finite. ■
The elasticity tends to infinity as γμðGÞ tends to 1
We show that for any integer A, lim γ!" γ ε i ðG; γÞ > A. We have
Hence, for any integerÃ, we have ε i ðG; γÞ !ε i with
Now, grouping terms containing d i;q ,ε i writes
Since lim γ!" γ b i ðg; γÞ ¼ þ1, we obtain that lim γ!" γεi ¼Ã. Hence, takingÃ ! A, it stems that lim γ!" γεi > A, and the result follows. ■
The elasticity is increasing in γ 
